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1 Patterns of Trade and 
Structural Change 
Colin I. Bradford, Jr., and William H. Branson 
1.1 Introduction: Definition and Characteristics of NICs 
Because of its rapid economic growth over the last twenty years, 
Pacific Asia provides a fascinating laboratory for analyzing the dynam- 
ics of economic growth. The fact that growth in Pacific Asia has been 
export-led has added to the analytical interest in the area both because 
of the impact of exports from Pacific Asia on the rest of the world and 
because of the interaction between trade and growth characteristic of 
the Pacific Asian experience. Japan led the way to dynamic growth in 
the 1960s. If Japan had been the only country in the region to achieve 
high growth, Japan’s unique qualities would have been seen as the main 
determinants of exceptional performance. In the 1970s, however, the 
East Asian newly industrializing countries (N1Cs)-South Korea, Tai- 
wan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (often referred to as the Gang of 
Four)-became major exporters of manufactured goods on a global 
scale and achieved extraordinarily high rates of economic growth. The 
remaining developing countries in Pacific Asia, sometimes referred to 
as the ASEAN Four (Association of South East Asian NationsbMa- 
laysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia-have shown strong, 
though not spectacular, economic performance in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. (Although a member of ASEAN, Singapore is nevertheless 
in the Gang of Four; also, the conference on which this volume is based 
was organized before Brunei entered ASEAN.) The major Latin Amer- 
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ican countries-Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico-also manifested high 
growth and export performance in the 1970s, but they experienced 
enormous financial problems in the 1980s. The Mediterranean Euro- 
pean Countries-Greece, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal-industrial- 
ized rapidly in the 1960s and exported manufactures at rapid rates in 
the 1970s without the financial crunch in the 1980s experienced by 
Latin America. 
This diverse economic record among high-growth, trade-oriented 
industrializing countries raises broad questions regarding the relation- 
ship of trade, structural change, and economic growth. From a global 
perspective, the most immediate issue is whether the East Asian NICs 
are sui generis, unique cases unreplicable elsewhere because of their 
unusual conditions, circumstances, and characteristics, or whether the 
East Asian NICs represent models that not only can but should be 
emulated by other industrializing nations. This is an issue which is 
addressed comparatively in chapters 7 and 8, by Bradford and Krause, 
and which occupied a good deal of the discussions at the conference 
in Kuala Lumpur. 
It becomes clear from such analyses and exchanges that defining the 
phenomenon of dynamic, trade-oriented growth is a challenging intel- 
lectual task. Most analysts would agree that the East Asian Gang of 
Four are NICs, if by the term newly industrializing countries is meant 
countries with exceptionally high GDP growth rates and unusually 
strong export performance, especially of manufactured goods exports. 
But beyond this, the issue gets more difficult; it goes to the heart of 
thinking and theorizing about growth and development and the rela- 
tionship of trade to sectoral change and aggregate performance, about 
which there is great debate, discussion, and controversy. This issue 
will not be settled here, but its main contours will be explored as a 
framework for reading the other analyses in this volume. 
The issue of uniqueness versus universality of dynamic development 
is an old one. While concerned principally about the limited spread of 
economic growth historically, Simon Kuznets wondered in 1965 
“whether the restrictive locus of pioneering impact is an inherent char- 
acteristic of all revolutionary breakthroughs to a new economic epoch” 
(1966, 465). The time periods when such “breakthroughs,” “turning 
points,” or “takeoffs” occurred are as much matters of controversy 
as the nature of the dynamic surge itself. Differences between Kuz- 
nets’s designation of the time periods for the “beginning of modern 
growth” in what are now advanced countries and Rostow’s (1978, 
p. 778, table N-31, n. 2) “takeoff” periods are not substantial. How- 
ever, Lloyd Reynolds’s (1983) “turning points” to “a sustained rise in 
per capita income” differ greatly from Walt Rostow’s takeoff periods. 
Reynolds and Rostow agree that Latin America preceded East Asia, 
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but Reynolds’s analysis points to turning points in the mid-to-late nine- 
teenth century, whereas Rostow’s takeoff periods are in the mid- 
twentieth century (see table 1,l). 
The major studies of the recent spurts in industrialization, growth, 
and trade have varying criteria for establishing categories. The first 
major study of the NICs was published by the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1979. While acknowl- 
edging that borderlines between categories were “bound to be arbi- 
trary,” ten countries were identified as NICs based on (a) their rapid 
penetration of world markets of manufactures, (6) a rising share of 
industrial employment, and (c) an increase in real GDP per capita 
relative to the more advanced industrial countries (OECD 1979, 18- 
22). These criteria established Greece, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, 
Brazil, Mexico, and the Gang of Four in East Asia as NICs. The 
Chatham House study of the NICs published in 1982 focused on the 
Gang of Four plus Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and India, all of which 
had achieved exports of manufactures in excess of $1 billion by 1976 
(Turner and McMullen 1982, 6, 10, table 2.1). The Development As- 
sistance Committee (DAC) in its 1982 Review examined “second tier” 
exporters and distinguished between NICs and potential NICs based 
on both the magnitude of manufactured exports in 1979 and their growth 
rate between 1972 and 1978, while maintaining the classification of the 
ten OECD-designated countries as NICs (OECD 1982, 123-32, esp. 
table XII-2 and n. 1 on p. 123). Interestingly, the only developing coun- 
tries to have both more than $1 billion in manufactured exports in 1979 
and average growth rates in manufactured exports between 1972 and 
1978 above 13% are Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Brazil in the $3 
billion and above range, and Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
in the $1-$2 billion range, Hong Kong was the only other country 
besides Taiwan and Korea to have above $10 billion in manufactured 
exports, but Hong Kong experienced a 1972-78 growth rate of exports 
Table 1.1 Transition Periods in Dynamic Developing Economies 
Turning Points 
(Reynolds) 
Takeoff 
(Rostow) 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Thailand 
Colombia 
1910 
1895 
1850 
1876 
1860 
1850 
1855 
1961-68 (p. 555) 
1953-60 (p. 540) 
1933-50 (p. 486) 
1940-60 (p. 493) 
1933-50 (p. 474) 
1960s (p. 551) 
n.a. 
Sources: Reynolds 1983, 941-80, esp. 943 and 958. Rostow 1978, pages indicated in 
table. 
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in the 7% 13% range. The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) have a category they call “major exporters of manufac- 
turers,” the criteria for which are unspecified. This category excludes 
Taiwan for noneconomic reasons and also leaves out Spain (which is 
classified by the World Bank as an “industrial market economy”) and 
Mexico (which is classified as a “middle income oil exporter”). The 
World Bank and the IMF category of major exporters of manufactures 
includes Greece, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Korea as well as Israel and South Africa. The World 
Bank adds two additional countries: the Philippines and Thailand (World 
Bank 1985, p. xi; International Monetary Fund 1985, 201). 
Development of a clear theory that would predict which countries 
will be the next NICs rather than establish criteria for the designation 
of NICs ex post is one of the central problems of the field of economic 
development. Rostow’s analysis of takeoffs is an attempt at such a 
theory whose success is not universally acknowledged. While devel- 
opment theorists struggle with the problem, a more systematic empir- 
ical approach to the identification of NICs may be feasible. We have 
in mind the application of cluster analysis to a large body of data on 
developing countries, such as is contained in the World Bank data base. 1 
A clustering algorithm applied to such a data base would ascertain 
whether a group of countries that are generally considered NICs emerges 
as a separate cluster on the basis of the characteristics in the data base. 
This would identify a cluster of countries that are similar to each other 
relative to the entire group’s dissimilarity to the rest of the countries. 
If such a cluster emerged, and if some non-NIC countries were also in 
it, they would share the characteristics of the already identified NICs. 
This type of analysis might provide a more systematic basis for iden- 
tification of next-tier NICs. The entire procedure would test the validity 
of our current identifications of NICs as a meaningful economic category. 
Despite all the limitations, qualifications, and differences in defini- 
tions, it is clear that the developing economies of Pacific Asia are of 
great interest in the study of dynamic trade and development perfor- 
mance. The East Asian Gang of Four qualify as NICs according to 
most classifications, even if the category either varies or is unclear; 
and Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines are of consequence in most 
studies as examples of potential NICs. There seems to be some con- 
vergence of analytical opinion that the relevant comparisons outside 
Pacific Asia are Greece, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal in Europe, 
and Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in Latin America. However, even 
though it seems to be clear which countries are NICs, it is not as clear 
what it means to be a NIC and, therefore, whether the NICs represent 
exceptional cases or replicable models. The fact that it is agreed that 
the category in the 1970s and early 1980s contains only a relatively few 
countries and that there is general agreement on the countries which 
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should be identified as NICs does not provide the answer to the ques- 
tion, are the NICs sui generis? 
The meaning of the NIC category explored most thoroughly in this 
volume is the relationship between exceptional export performance, 
especially in the growth of manufactured exports, and dynamic de- 
velopment, by which is meant some combination of rapid aggregate 
economic growth and structural change. The sectoral composition of 
output and trade, the rates of structural change in production and 
exports, and the relationship of rates of structural change to economic 
growth constitute continuing themes throughout the volume. The re- 
lationship between the sectoral composition of output and the com- 
position of exports is of considerable interest in understanding the 
dynamics of growth and development. It raises a number of broad 
issues recurrent in the book, in particular the relationship of factor 
proportions to the composition of trade, the impact of abundant re- 
source endowments on industrialization and manufactured exports, and 
the rapidity of adjustment of the patterns of trade and structures of 
production to dynamic growth in different “tiers” of countries. These 
are discussed more fully in the next section of this chapter. Also raised 
by these analyses are a set of issues related to the types of development 
strategies, styles, and regimes associated with varied economic out- 
comes. The nature of the mix between active government policies and 
market forces, the relative effectiveness of credit versus fiscal subsi- 
dies, and the balance between demand- versus supply-determined in- 
dustrialization and exports are examined in the last section of this 
chapter. 
1.2 Industrialization and Structural Change 
The relationship between trade and structural change is brought to 
the fore by the dynamic performance of the transitional economies of 
Pacific Asia and their analogues in Mediterranean Europe and Latin 
America that have been identified as NICs. An index developed by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) that 
measures the change in the value-added share of sixteen individual 
manufacturing sectors in total value added between 1965 and 1980 is 
a good measure of the rapidity of structural change in the manufacturing 
sector over the period in which there have been rapid exports of man- 
ufactures from the NICs and other transitional economies. This index 
is given in table 1.2 along with the average annual growth rate of 
manufacturing value added over 1965-80 for sixteen transitional econ- 
omies in three major regions. (Again, no data are available for Taiwan.) 
Overall, the figures in table 1.2 confirm the expected relationship 
between high rates of structural change within manufacturing and the 
dynamic performance in exports of manufactures and in aggregate 
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Table 1.2 Structural Change and Industrialization: 1965-80 
~ ~~ 
Index of Structural Change 
Transitional Economies in Manufacturing” Added in Manufacturing 
European NICs 
Average Growth Rate of Value 
Spain 24.73 6.78 
Yugoslavia 12.01 6.94 
Portugal 21.61 7.18 
Greece 13.56 7.00 
Asian NICs 
India 20.89 
Korea 31.37 
Taiwan n.a. 
Hong Kong 9.87 
Singapore 48.32 
Philippines 10.95 
Thailand 17.69 
Malaysia 15.86 
Colombia 10.90 
Brazil 30.03 
Mexico 14.83 
Argentina 15.90 
Indonesia 19.52 
Developed countries 10.90 
Developing countries 13.83 
World 10.60 
Next-tier NICs 
Natural Resource NICs 
Global Averages 
2.59 
18.99 
n.a. 
6.05 
11.41 
5.45 
7.98 
8.12 
6.36 
9.50 
7.09 
3.12 
10.20 
4.66 
6.55 
4.85 
Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industry and Develop- 
ment: Global Report 1985 (New York: United Nations, 1985), pp. 31-40 and country 
tables pp. 135ff. 
aThe index of structural change is derived from sixteen manufacturing branches. It is a 
measure of the degree of correlation between the value-added shares in 1965 and 1980. 
If the correlation is high, then there is little structural change and the index is low. But 
if the correlation is low, then there is a lot of structural change and the index is high. 
Both expanding and shrinking branches contribute to the index (UNIDO 1985, 39). 
growth associated with the NICs. Of the total of thirty-two observations 
of the two variables in the table, only three are below the world averages 
and seven are substantially below the averages for developing coun- 
tries, which are higher than the averages for developed countries. Of 
the sixteen economies, Korea, Singapore, and Brazil are in the top 
four according to measures of both structural change and value-added 
growth in manufacturing. One suspects that were there data for Taiwan, 
it would be in the high range of these measures as well. Hong Kong 
is the exception. Because of the dominance of textiles within the man- 
ufacturing sector and in the exports of manufactures of Hong Kong, 
dynamic growth in the 1965-80 period has been associated with this 
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one subsector rather than with shifts in the sectoral composition of 
output and exports. Textiles was already a significant sector by 1965 
in Hong Kong, so that the rate of structural change associated with its 
growth is relatively less compared with other transitional economies. 
Indonesia is surprisingly high on both measures, the high rates of 
change deriving undoubtedly from low absolute levels of industriali- 
zation. The two measures for the next-tier NICs-the Philippines, Thai- 
land, Malaysia, and Colombia-show relatively uniform rates among 
the four countries in the category, and averaged together they are almost 
exactly the average for the developing countries as a whole. Mexico 
and Argentina experienced rates of structural change above the average 
for developing countries, though half of that of Brazil. Mexico also had 
an above-average rate of growth in valued added in manufacturing, but 
Argentina’s rate was below the world average. The European NICs 
experienced rates of growth in manufacturing value added slightly above 
the average for developing countries and well above that of the indus- 
trial countries. Rates of structural change in manufacturing vary among 
the European NICs, with Spain and Portugal having very high indexes 
and with Yugoslavia and Greece having indexes only slightly above the 
world average. 
The association of unusually high rates of structural change in man- 
ufacturing with exceptionally high rates of growth in manufactured 
exports is a useful lens through which to view the country experience 
and trade patterns analyzed in this volume. Rapid industrialization, 
significant shifts in the sectoral composition of output and exports, and 
high rates of economic growth along with major surges in exports of 
manufactures constitute the dynamic development patterns now iden- 
tified with the NICs. The policy experience of each country, the internal 
economic structure, and the trade relationships within Pacific Asia and 
between the region and the world economy provide material for further 
insight into the dynamics of rapid development and export growth. 
1.3 
Patterns of trade have changed substantially between the OECD area 
(North America, Japan, Europe) and the developing world of Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia since the early 1960s. The United States 
and Japan have developed complementary trade with Latin America 
and Asia in manufactures, exchanging capital goods for final consumer 
goods. Europe’s trade with Africa has remained more traditional, since 
the African developing countries below the Sahara are not yet exporters 
of manufactures. 
Trade patterns within Pacific Asia have also changed substantially 
over the same period. We can distinguish three tiers of countries in the 
area, consisting of Japan, the Gang of Four, and the ASEAN Four. 
Global and Regional Patterns of Trade 
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Complex trade relations have developed among these three tiers, and 
currently tensions exist as the countries look toward the future. As the 
Gang of Four and the ASEAN Four move up the ladder of comparative 
advantage, to what extent will the markets of the Pacific Asian countries 
in the upper tiers open to the exports of the lower-tier countries, and 
to what extent will lower-tier countries have to supplant upper-tier 
countries in exporting to third markets, particularly the United States 
and Europe? These are important issues for economic relations within 
Pacific Asia. 
In this section of the chapter we draw on the conference papers and 
comments to discuss the highlights of the changes in trade patterns 
between the OECD countries and Pacific Asia and within the latter, 
and we speculate on their implications for future developments. We 
begin by reviewing major findings on trade patterns between the OECD 
“Big Three”-the United States, Japan, and the European Community 
(EC)-and Pacific Asia. Here the overview papers by Branson, Wael- 
broeck, and Yamazawa (chaps. 2-4) are in surprising agreement. Then 
we discuss the basis for trade within Pacific Asia, drawing mainly on 
the papers by Bradford and Krause (chaps. 7-8). It is clear from all 
of these papers, as well as that of Kotlikoff and Learner (chap. 9), that 
in a broad sense a factor-proportions model of comparative advantage 
is useful in understanding the patterns of trade of Pacific Asia. This 
impression is also generally confirmed by the country papers. Next we 
discuss briefly the potential problems of trade adjustment in the three 
tiers of Pacific Asia, as they move up the ladder of industrial and 
technological development. In a sense, the lower-tier economies are 
crowding up against the higher-tier ones; how are they each going to 
adjust? Finally, we will offer some observations on a point that comes 
up in several of the country papers and was a subject of considerable 
comment: the “problem” posed by natural resource endowments as 
the ASEAN Four industrialize. This discussion is reminiscent of the 
“Dutch disease” literature in northern Europe. 
1.3.1 Trade between the OECD and Pacific Asia 
The growth of manufacturing capacity in the developing countries, 
especially in Asia and Latin America since the 1960s, is changing the 
nature of north-south trade. As Riedel (1984) shows, only the sub- 
Saharan African countries now remain one-or-two-primary-commodity 
exporters. For many developing countries, the growth of manufactured 
exports has reduced the share of primary exports to well below 50% 
of total exports. 
Growth in manufactured exports in the Latin American and Asian 
developing countries has been concentrated in labor-intensive goods, 
mainly consumer goods and assembly products. Textiles and simple 
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electronics are good examples. To expand their manufacturing capacity, 
these economies must import capital equipment from the industrial 
countries. This has created an exchange of labor-intensive, somewhat 
lower-technology consumer goods for more capital-intensive (both 
physical and human) and technology-intensive goods. This exchange 
contributes at the margin to an increase in specialization within and 
complementarity between the economies involved. 
The overview papers by Branson, Waelbroeck, and Yamazawa are 
in general agreement on the relevance of this analysis for trade between 
the countries of the OECD and Pacific Asia. At the broadest level, 
Branson’s comparison of the patterns of trade in manufactures of the 
United States, Japan, and the EC finds a substantial expansion of this 
form of complementary trade between the United States and Latin 
America and between Japan and the rest of Pacific Asia. This proximity 
phenomenon is also noted by Waelbroeck: Europe’s trade with the 
south is concentrated in Africa, the United States with Latin America, 
and Japan with Asia. The United States and Japan each compete in 
the other’s “natural” market and have the second shares in these 
markets, with Europe third in both. Yamazawa’s paper, concentrating 
on Japan and her Pacific neighbors, also notes the importance of com- 
plementary trade in manufactures. Thus, ail three papers see the same 
general development in trade patterns. 
This broad picture is complicated to some extent by the split in the 
direction of U.S. exports and imports of manufactures. The major 
source in the developing world of U.S. consumer goods imports is 
Pacific Asia, while the major destination of U.S. exports is Latin Amer- 
ica. The latter remains relatively resource-rich, like the ASEAN Four, 
with their exports depending largely on world market conditions. While 
U.S. manufactured exports are more closely tied to economic devel- 
opments in Latin America, U.S. imports of manufactures are linked 
to Pacific Asia. 
The implications of these developing patterns of trade and interde- 
pendence between the United States, Japan, and Europe on the one hand 
and the major developing-country regions on the other can be the object 
of interesting speculation. It may be that Japan’s trade is becoming rel- 
atively more complementary and integrated with the more “proximate” 
economies of Asia, while Europe’s trade is more closely tied to Africa. 
This pattern is suggested by ajoint reading of the three overview papers. 
The United States may be in an intermediate position. Its exports are 
more concentrated on Latin America, which has experienced midrange 
growth (between Africa and Asia). At the same time, the United States 
is increasingly integrated with Pacific Asia on the import side. This sug- 
gests that a broader Pacific concept (including Latin America) is now an 
important focal point for U.S. foreign economic policy. 
U Colin I. Bradford, Jr., and William H. Branson 
1.3.2 Factor Proportions and Trade 
The rise of new industrial powers in the world economy has been 
based on rapid structural transformation within these industrializing 
countries. This internal process of structural change has been char- 
acterized not only by the broad shift from primary production (mining 
and agriculture) to industry but also by sectoral shifts within manu- 
facturing, as we have seen in the measure of structural change in table 
1.2. The general pattern of development is for a gradual sectoral evo- 
lution to occur as the availability and the quality of factors of production 
evolve. 
The industrialization process begins with natural resource based 
manufacturing. As the urban labor force increases, labor-intensive 
manufacturing grows more rapidly and eventually predominates. Per 
capita income growth based on the more dynamic industrial sector 
generates increased savings in the economy. This capital accumulation 
enables the economy to move into industrial sectors requiring more 
capital-intensive modes of production. Sophistication grows with in- 
dustrial experience, and educational levels rise with economic growth. 
As a consequence, the economy eventually moves into skill- and tech- 
nology-intensive industrial sectors. 
These sectoral shifts within industry essentially respond to changing 
availabilities of inputs into the manufacturing process. Comparative 
advantage in trade is determined by the relative abundance of these 
factor inputs. Therefore, changes in the relative availability of labor, 
capital, skills, and technological innovation change not only the struc- 
ture of industry but the composition of trade as well. 
Countries at given moments in time can be thought of as being on a 
ladder of comparative advantage, tiered according to their standing in 
factor endowments. Data in the papers by Bradford and Krause confirm 
that the composition of exports from Pacific Asia reflects different 
factor intensities among countries and over time. Moving up the ladder 
of comparative advantage, natural-resource-intensive exports diminish 
continuously as a percentage of total exports, labor-intensive exports 
surge and fade, and physical and human capital-intensive exports in- 
crease their share. 
The very substantial preponderance of labor-intensive exports from 
the Asian NICs is clearly manifested in the data in Bradford’s paper 
as is the increase in physical and human capital exports. The nascent 
rise of labor-intensive exports from the next-tier NICs in the 1970s is 
also apparent. Accelerated structural change of exports is evident in 
the European NICs; structural change is more restrained in the Latin 
American NICs and Indonesia, where natural resource exports gen- 
erate the foreign exchange required for growth. 
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The NICs, by definition, are on a divergent development path, out- 
pacing other economies at similar stages of development. Their dy- 
namism appears to have gone beyond that which follows naturally from 
changing factor endowments, though favorable factor conditions were 
important. Public policies and government promotion of export-ori- 
ented growth strategies also played a major role in the unusual success 
of the NICs. By the very nature of this process, the NICs posed ad- 
justment challenges for the Pacific Basin, for the OECD economies, 
and for the entire world economy. This dynamic change in the com- 
position of exports from Pacific Asia does not appear to have been 
accompanied thus far by changes in the composition of imports that 
would allow the absorption of export surges within the region. This 
pattern poses trade policy challenges for the future as factor endow- 
ments and export promotion policies play a continuing role in changing 
the composition of exports from dynamic economies that seek ex- 
panding markets for their exports. 
1.3.3 Trade Adjustment among the Three Tiers of Pacific Asia 
As the economies of Pacific Asia develop and grow, two alternative 
models of evolution of their trade patterns are likely to be relevant. 
The actual outcome will be some mixture of the two, but the distinction 
is useful analytically. In the first model, exports from the lower-tier 
countries displace those of upper-tier countries in world markets, par- 
ticularly North America and Europe, as the upper-tier countries move 
on to higher levels of sophistication and technology. In this model, as 
Japan’s export mix shifts toward high-technology items, such as com- 
puters and sophisticated machinery and electronics, the Gang of Four 
countries expand, for example, their exports of consumer manufac- 
tures, such as television receivers, to North America and Europe. As 
the Gang of Four moves gradually out of supplying textiles to these 
third markets, the ASEAN Four move in. A similar process could take 
place in electronics assembly. In this model, higher-tier economies in 
Pacific Asia do not open their own markets significantly to imports 
from lower-tier countries; instead they compete in external markets. 
In the conference, representatives of the lower-tier countries voiced 
opinions that seemed to reflect their view that this is the model favored 
by the upper-tier countries, particularly Japan and Korea. We might 
call this the “world integration” model. 
The alternative has already been suggested. As the upper-tier coun- 
tries grow and their industrial structures become more sophisticated, 
they open to imports from the lower-tier countries. The latter would 
find the direction of their manufactured exports more oriented toward 
the other Pacific Asian countries than to Europe or North America in 
this model, which we might call “regional integration.” In the confer- 
14 Colin I. Bradford, Jr., and William H. Branson 
ence, lower-tier representatives seemed to prefer the regional integra- 
tion model to world integration. 
Which of these patterns seems more likely to develop? Manufactured 
imports were about $150 billion in Europe and in the United States in 
the early 1980s and $40 billion in Japan. Exports from the Asian NICs 
and the ASEAN Four were a relatively small share of the European 
market; in his paper Jean Waelbroeck argues that the Gang of Four 
and ASEAN Four shares of the European market can be expanded 
without meeting active resistance. The U.S. market remains relatively 
open with the exception of textiles, in which trade is governed by the 
international Multi-Fiber Arrangement. In textiles, the Pacific Asian 
countries face potentially serious competition from China. Neverthe- 
less, the world integration model seems feasible in terms of potential 
expansion both of shares of North American and European manufac- 
tured imports and of their aggregate levels. 
Japan’s trade pattern is substantially different from that of the United 
States or Europe. Because of her need to import raw materials, Japan 
must run a sizable surplus on trade in manufactures just to maintain 
overall balance. Imports from the rest of Pacific Asia already occupy 
a substantial share of Japan’s low level of manufactured imports, as 
shown in the papers by Branson and Yamazawa. This means that a 
significant further opening of Japan’s market to exports of manufactures 
from Pacific Asia might require an expansion of her exports of man- 
ufactures to those countries. As Yamazawa shows, Japan already has 
established a complementary trade with the Gang of Four and the 
ASEAN Four, exporting capital goods while importing raw materials 
from the ASEAN Four and consumer goods from the Gang of Four. 
This is a pattern similar to trade between the United States and less- 
developed countries (LDCs) on a broader scale, with U.S. raw material 
imports coming largely from Latin America and consumer goods im- 
ports from Asia. 
Thus expansion of trade along the regional integration model would 
probably involve growth in cross-trade in manufactures, with countries 
specializing further along lines of comparative advantage, as outlined 
in the paper by Krause. Cross-trade in manufactures would require a 
mutual openness of markets, rather than a unilateral opening by the 
upper-tier countries in Pacific Asia. 
The implications of each outcome-world integration or regional 
integration-are still shadowy but are potentially important. The world 
integration model would bring the Pacific Asian countries, and perhaps 
China and South Asia as well, into a pattern of world complementar- 
ities, with a relatively high level of interdependence with the United 
States and possibly Latin America. The regional integration model 
would emphasize the interdependence among the Pacific Asian coun- 
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tries, with looser economic ties to the United States. The latter model 
could be an important element in the development of a regional power 
to rival the United States, Europe, and even the USSR, while the world 
integration model could tie the Pacific Asia economies individually 
more closely to the United States. 
1.3.4 Natural Resources and Industrialization 
The principal differences between the already-industrialized Asian 
NICs and the ASEAN Four are size and natural resource endowments. 
The Asian NICs industrialized on a base of skilled labor, a homoge- 
neous population, good location, and perhaps a self-selected entrepre- 
neurial class that was separated from China after the revolution. While 
to differing degrees the ASEAN Four also have a Chinese entrepre- 
neurial class, they are much larger, more heterogeneous, and, most 
importantly, well-endowed with natural resources. Natural resources 
present a problem for development that is essentially the same as the 
now famous Dutch disease problem of deindustrialization in northern 
Europe. 
In its simplest variant, the analysis runs as follows. The natural 
resource development boom pulls labor into that sector from agriculture 
and manufacturing, raising real wages throughout the economy. At the 
same time, export strength in the natural resource sector tends to 
appreciate the currency in real terms. Both the rise in the real wage 
and the currency appreciation squeeze profits in the incipient manu- 
facturing sector, blocking its development. Thus, it is clear in an in- 
tuitive way that discovery and subsequent development of natural re- 
sources could dampen industrialization that would provide a more 
secure, longer-run basis for growth. 
Considerations from models of trade theory add refinement to the 
standard Dutch disease analysis, as Ronald Findlay noted in a percep- 
tive comment at the conference. The real wage will rise in the shrinking 
(or relatively slowly growing) manufacturing sector only if the natural 
resource boom pulls resources away from it in a way that increases 
labor-intensity in the manufacturing sector. In a simple two-factor 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade model, this would require that the 
shrinking manufacturing sector be capital-intensive relative to the ex- 
panding natural resource sector. In this standard case the capital-labor 
ratio would tend to fall in both sectors. 
A more appropriate model, outlined by Findlay, would have three 
sectors-agricultural, manufacturing, resource extraction-each with 
a specific factor-land, capital, and resources-but all using labor. Then 
expansion of the resource sector, by pulling labor from agriculture and 
manufacturing, would raise both the land-labor and capital-labor ratios. 
This would raise the real wage in terms of both food and manufactures, 
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yielding a strong Dutch disease result. This would be the model most 
applicable in the case of the ASEAN Four. It may also help to explain 
why the Latin American NICs have not achieved the same degree of 
specialization in manufactured exports as the East Asian NICs. 
If this is the appropriate model, what policy can be followed to permit 
continued industrialization? Essentially, the problem is to shield the 
incipient manufacturing sector from the effects of the natural resource 
boom. Since the resource boom has both internal (rising real wages) 
and external (real exchange rate appreciation) effects, two measures 
might be useful. Taxation of wages in the resource sector could reduce 
the pressure on real wages in the manufacturing sector. Profits taxation 
or directed use of the budgetary surplus in a nationalized resource 
sector to invest abroad or to import capital goods could eliminate the 
effect on the exchange rate. Both policy measures are essentially ways 
to ensure that the proceeds of the resource boom are invested in growth 
in manufacturing by offsetting the real wage and exchange rate effects 
of a natural resource export boom. 
1.4 Government Policy and Market Forces 
The dynamic growth and export performance of the Pacific Asian 
developing countries raise the question of how these success stories 
were achieved. The relationship of cause and effect is an elusive one 
in economics generally and particularly so in analyzing aggregate per- 
formance. In a not dissimilar volume Arnold C. Harberger notes “the 
virtual impossibility of building a direct link of modern theory between 
the observed growth rate of a country and its overall economic policy” 
(1984, 6). The eight country studies in the present volume provide a 
sense of the variety of policy experience in Pacific Asia. As in the 
Harberger volume, which contains case studies of five developed and 
seven developing countries, the reader of the chapters in this book 
undoubtedly will conclude that ‘‘there is no magic formula” (Harberger 
1984, 427).2 
Nevertheless, economics would be a dull and probably less insightful 
enterprise without controversy. The East Asian NICs, in particular, 
have inspired a set of debates regarding the causes of their economic 
achievements. These debates concern the relative contribution of mar- 
ket forces and economic policies, of outward versus inward orientation, 
and of internal liberalization and export promotion; the effectiveness 
of fiscal versus credit subsidies; and whether exports are demand driven 
or supply determined. 
The relative roles of markets and governments in dynamic growth 
is an old issue in economics. There has been a lively debate for decades 
in Latin America on what Albert 0. Hirschman called in a widely read 
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essay in 1961 “ideologies of economic development” (1961). More 
recently the issue has surfaced as a debate about getting prices right 
versus getting policies right. This version of the controversy was sparked 
by empirical research on price distortions undertaken by the World 
Bank which found that higher economic growth was associated with 
lower price distortions in thirty-one developing countries and that high 
price distortion was associated with low growth (World Bank 1983; 
Agarwala 1983). Later World Bank analyses showed that “big price 
distortions also lead to slower growth of exports and agreater likelihood 
of debt-servicing difficulties” (World Bank 1985,54). Although Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong were not included in the thirty-one coun- 
tries analyzed by the World Bank, there has been a tendency to identify 
the Pacific Asian developing countries as market-oriented economies 
with low levels of price distortion. Indeed, Thailand, Korea, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines are among the six countries with the lowest price 
distortions as measured by the World Bank’s composite index (World 
Bank 1983, table 6.1). As a result, the Pacific Asian experience has 
been at the center of the current controversy surrounding the efficacy 
of markets and governmental policies in promoting de~elopment .~ 
1.4.1 Inward versus Outward Orientation 
The highly dynamic export performance of the Pacific Asian devel- 
oping economies has given rise to a discussion about the virtues of 
inward- versus outward-oriented growth strategies (Streeten 1982; Bal- 
assa 1983). The East Asian and Latin American NICs have frequently 
been cited as contrasting examples of export orientation and import 
substitution respectively (Morgan Guaranty 1983). Part of the contro- 
versy undoubtedly derives from the use of loosely fashioned phrases 
which sound like dichotomous typologies when in fact more rigorous 
specification of meaning would reveal that they define different points 
along a spectrum of policy regimes rather than stark alternatives. What 
follows is an attempt to attach differentiated meaning t o  commonly 
used labels that are often used as substitutes for one another. The 
results are summarized in table 1.3 and reveal a continuum from autarky 
to export promotion that we hope captures a variety of configurations 
of elements defining development strategies. No attempt is made here 
to identify particular countries with specific development thrusts, but 
it is hoped that by differentiating the categories and conceptualizing 
them as elements of a spectrum, the varieties of policy experience 
analyzed in the case studies in this volume may be thought about more 
clearly than by applying the dichotomous framework conventionally 
used. 
Inward versus outward orientation are helpful as the most general 
categories under which a variety of development strategies can be 
18 Colin I. Bradford, Jr., and William H. Branson 
Table 1.3 Development Strategy Typologies: A Continuum 
Autarky 
Closed economy 
Import Substitution 
Inward orientation 
Outward Orientation 
Trade economy 
Open economy 
Export promotion 
No trade Dirigisme 
“Delinking” 
Self-reliance 
Exports and imports less than 5% 
(a)  Discriminates against all 
as a share of GDP 
imports through controls: EERm 
> EERx 
(b) Selective discrimination 
(c )  Mild and limited applications 
(“left wing deviations”) 
Priority given to the domestic Markets 
economy 
Priority given to exports Markets 
Exports 15% or more as a share of 
Internal liberalization EERx = 
(a )  tradable goods 
(6) (a)  + nontradable goods 
(c) (a )  + (b) + macroeconomic 
variables 
(a)  Uniform subsidies for all 
exports: EERx > EERm 
(b) Selective subsidies: 
Industrial policy 
Import substitution 
(“right wing deviations”) Dirigisme 
GDP 
EERm 
Note: EERx and EERm are the real effective exchange rates for exports and imports, 
respectively. 
classified. They imply simply a difference in emphasis-as between the 
domestic market (not imports) and trade, and in particular exports, as 
the main sources of economic growth. They appear, then, at the mid- 
point of the spectrum between autarky and export promotion rather 
than necessarily being identified with the extremes in the type of de- 
velopment strategy. 
Autarky means no trade and would derive from a severe government 
decision to “delink” from the world economy in order to achieve some 
measure of self-reliance or the appearance thereof (Diaz- Alejandro 1978). 
The terms closed and open are often used to describe the bias of policies 
toward import substitution or export promotion. In this rendering, it 
is helpful to have designations which empirically identify the impor- 
tance of trade in the conomy. A closed economy is defined here as one 
in which trade (exports plus imports) as a share of GDP is low, that 
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is, less than 5%. It may be that this ratio is low because of deliberate 
policies, but it may also be due to size, the abundance of natural 
resources, the similarity of country endowments to world endowments, 
or other factors. A closed economy is not autarkic but neither is it one 
in which trade is a major factor in the economy. By definition, closed 
economies are not of much interest in this volume. A “trade economy” 
is its opposite. It is a category in which exports are a large share of 
GDP, say above 15%. The phrases export-led or open economy are 
more frequently used. However, export-led implies some empirical 
substantiation of a cause-effect relationship from exports to economic 
growth, when in fact high GDP growth may drive exports by generating 
a supply surplus. The term open economy associates internal liberali- 
zation (the removal of import controls, tariffs, etc.) with trade as a 
large share of GDP. Abstracting for the moment the direction of the 
causality or the degree of this association, the phrase trade economy 
attempts to convey the importance of exports in an economy that is 
necessarily embodied in a high-export share of GDP. The term trade 
economy is meant to be policy neutral. The question of whether exports 
are driven by external demand and thereby induce internal growth or 
are supply determined is discussed briefly at the end of this chapter. 
Both the terms closed economy and trade economy identify endogenous 
economic outcomes rather than policy inputs. 
An “import substitution” strategy is a set of deliberate policies that 
discriminates against those imports which compete with existing or 
nascent domestic sources of production. Import substitution does not 
necessarily imply a low volume of imports, as capital goods imports 
may be essential to establish the industries necessary to achieve self- 
sufficiency in the designated range of activities. Normally, import sub- 
stitution strategies discriminate against imports through the use of im- 
port controls, tariffs, multiple exchange rate systems, or other policy 
devices (Findlay 1981, 30-33; Krause 1981, 597-611). But the scope 
and degree of the bias against imports may vary considerably. In the 
extreme case, it is the dominant policy, and hence, the development 
strategy is fundamentally determined by it. In a more limited case, 
policies may be applied only to selected sectors, with the bulk of the 
economy otherwise being relatively “open” in the sense that most 
activity is market determined. It is also possible that selective import 
substitution policies may be part of an industrial policy which in turn 
is part of an export promotion strategy. 
The other large category of strategies is outward orientation, which 
means that priority is given to exports either in the economy or in the 
policy of the country. In its mildest manifestation, exports may be 
responsive to external demand and grow rapidly as a result of the 
intrinsic competitiveness of the economy or, at a minimum, of the 
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tradable goods sectors. On the other hand, there may be a deliberate 
policy to liberalize the economy, ranging from a limited case of liber- 
alization only in tradable goods sectors to a more inclusive case of 
liberalization across the economy as a whole, even incorporating mac- 
roeconomic variables such as interest rates. Internal liberalization is 
labeled here as an “open economy” strategy. In most of the literature, 
open economy is synonymous with outward orientation, and the two 
terms are used interchangeably as if they have identical and equally 
specific meanings. 
In the formulation here, open economy is delineated as only one 
type of outward-oriented strategy, that associated with internal liber- 
alization. The open economy-internal liberalization strategy implies 
that the incentives to export are equivalent to the incentives to import, 
or as Anne Krueger puts it, “there is as much incentive to earn as to 
save foreign exchange” (1985, 20). This in effect means, as Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1986a) has emphasized, that the effective exchange rate for 
exports “is not significantly different” from the effective exchange rate 
for imports. Curiously, Bhagwati labels this an export promotion strat- 
egy (EP), which has a potentially quite different meaning from the 
characterization of the term to be set forth here. In Bhagwati’s for- 
mulation the absence of discrimination against exports is the major 
achievement and is seen to provide sufficient incentives for export 
“promotion.” A policy of equivalent incentives for imports and exports 
would be a free trade optimality point in Ronald Findlay’s (1981) in- 
genious formulation on the subject. 
Finally, the most dirigisme form of outward orientation is designated 
here as export promotion. In this strategy category, the state plays a 
major role in goal setting and policy implementation to achieve the 
goals. Variation can exist under an export promotion strategy. A mild 
form, for example, would be illustrated by uniform export subsidies 
across the range of exports rather than favoring some export sectors 
over others (Krueger 1981, 18). A more interventionist form of export 
promotion would be linked to an industrial policy which sets sectoral 
priorities for investment, credit, foreign exchange, imports, and/or sub- 
sidy allocations to make the structure of production conform to the 
export strategy. It is in this more interventionist type of export strategy 
that the relative effectiveness of fiscal versus credit subsidies, discussed 
below, is of greatest interest. Import substitution policies could run 
simultaneously with and’ support this style of development strategy. 
Under this strategy category, it is highly possible that the effective 
exchange rate provides more incentives for exports than for imports, 
in effect subsidizing exports and shielding import-competing industries. 
As a result, exports are promoted beyond the range of optimality lead- 
ing to what Findlay calls “right wing deviations” and Bhagwati now 
designates “ultra-EP strategy” (1986b). 
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These typologies of development strategies, while roughly hewn, at 
least differentiate among categories in the economic literature that are 
frequently lumped together. The often portrayed dichotomy between 
inward- versus outward-oriented growth strategies, in this framework, 
becomes more a gradual gradation of approaches to development com- 
posed of different clusters of elements. The eight transitional countries 
of Pacific Asia undoubtedly fall at different places on the continuum, 
as do their counterparts in Mediterranean Europe and Latin America. 
There is no reason to expect regional homogeneity. It may be hoped 
that the country experiences traced in this volume, as Alexander Ger- 
schenkron’s “journey” through the story of European industrialization 
in the nineteenth century, may, “by destroying what Bertrand Russell 
once called the ‘dogmatism of the untravelled,’ help in formulating a 
broader more enlightened view of the pertinent problems and in re- 
placing the absolute notions of what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’ by 
a more flexible and relativistic approach” (1982, 26-27). 
1.4.2 Fiscal versus Credit Subsidies 
The Asian NICs provide instructive contrasts between alternative 
policy measures to stimulate export-oriented industrialization. Two 
extremes are Korea, which essentially used a system of credit subsidies 
and financial repression, and Taiwan, which used fiscal subsidies with 
relatively free credit markets. The two cases are described in the papers 
by Wontack Hong and Chi Schive (chaps. 10-1 1). 
The credit subsidy approach begins with the identification of favored 
export-oriented sectors to receive low-interest loans. Since these are 
provided below market rates, a queue forms and credit must be ra- 
tioned. Unsuccessful applicants must turn to the curb market, where 
credit is available at a much higher interest rate. In general, the weighted 
average of the subsidized rate and the curb rate is an approximation 
of the shadow rate that would clear a free market. 
With capital costs subsidized in the favored sector and effectively 
taxed in the curb market, the favored sector tends to become too 
capital-intensive, or “large-scale.’’ The nonfavored sector becomes too 
labor-intensive, or “small-scale.’’ This implies that when the system 
is ended and both interest rates move toward the shadow rate, the 
formerly favored sector will suffer capital losses and some bankrupt- 
cies, while the nonfavored sector will shed labor. Thus, ending a credit 
subsidy regime may entail a period of bankruptcies and unemployment. 
Hong suggests that this was the case in Korea. 
In addition, the requirement that the banking sector provide loans 
at below-market rates, as well as a possible requirement to buy gov- 
ernment debt at low rates, means that deposit rates must be suppressed 
if the banking system is to remain profitable. This will tend to dis- 
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courage saving in the financial sector, shrinking the resource base for 
investment in industrialization. Thus, the credit subsidy route can re- 
duce saving and misallocate it, creating a deepening distortion that can 
be expensive to eliminate. Again, Korea may be an example of the 
problem. 
A fiscal subsidy on output or exports of the chosen industry can 
avoid these “side effects” without additional cost to the taxpayers. In 
the credit subsidy system, the cost is hidden in low deposit rates, while 
with fiscal subsidies it is explicit in the tax structure. To achieve equiv- 
alent incentives to invest in the chosen industries, the cost of fiscal 
subsidies should be less. They avoid the bias between factor inputs 
and the need for suppression of deposit interest rates. Further, the 
fiscal subsidies can be phased out without the twin difficulties of bank- 
ruptcy and unemployment threatening to reach unstable levels. Chi 
Schive’s paper on Taiwan illustrates the case. Thus, Pacific Asia pro- 
vides experiences with alternative forms of government intervention 
that can be instructive throughout the developing world. 
1.4.3 Demand- versus Supply-Driven Export Growth 
The trade and development literature contains discussions regarding 
the degree to which trade-related dynamic growth is externally driven 
or internally generated. James Riedel goes to quite some length to 
question the notion of trade as the “engine of growth” of developing 
countries, especially as this notion is put forward by Sir Arthur Lewis 
in his 1979 Nobel lecture. Nevertheless, Riedel concludes, after con- 
siderable statistical analysis, that “the evidence, therefore, suggests 
that supply rather than demand factors have principally determined 
LDC export performance in manufactures” (1984, 69). Curiously, this 
is not too distant from Lewis’s own assertion in the Nobel lecture that 
“if a sufficient number of LDCs reach self-sustaining growth, we are 
into a new world. For this will mean that instead of trade determining 
the rate of growth of LDC production, it will be the growth of LDC 
production that determines LDC trade, and internal forces that will 
determine the rate of growth of production” (Lewis 1980, 562). 
The focus in this volume on structural change and trade and the 
association of rapid structural change in industry with dynamic exports 
of manufactures highlights the issue of supply- versus demand-driven 
growth. The issue cannot be resolved here. However, evidence in the 
case studies in this book on the development strategies of Korea, Sin- 
gapore, and Taiwan seems to fit, with some variation among them, 
within the “export promotion” category above (Bradford 1986). This 
evidence, along with the association of unusually rapid rates of struc- 
tural change with transitional economies, leads toward the conclusion 
that supply push may have been more important than demand pull in 
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driving the transition process. Rapid structural change in manufacturing 
and in exports seems to have been induced by a strategic sectoral design 
that was an integral part of export promotion and seems to have gone 
beyond the scale feasible based on responsiveness to international de- 
mand under conditions of favorable factor endowments. High export 
growth associated with unusually rapid rates of structural change in 
manufacturing and exports suggests that public policy played a role in 
continuously shifting the specialization of production toward exports. 
The identification of supply push and export promotion strategies as 
key elements that determine dynamic transitional growth is offered 
here as a central idea with which to approach the studies in this book. 
Notes 
1. See Hartigan 1975 for an introduction to cluster analysis. A special ap- 
plication is factor analysis. Algorithms exist, so our suggestion here would 
appear to be feasible. 
2. The Harberger (1984) volume contains studies of the growth experience 
of twelve countries and explores “the connections between economic policy 
and economic growth” of Britain, Japan, Sweden, Germany, and the United 
States, and Tanzania, Ghana, Indonesia, Jamaica, Taiwan, Mexico, and Uruguay. 
3. For critical views see Bradford 1984, 121-26, and chap. 7 in this volume; 
Fishlow 1985; and Evans and Alizadeh 1984, 22-43, 43-46. 
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